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Bab el-Mandeb crisis: New geopolitical flashpoint in West Asia
This article is authored by Jajati K Pattnaik and Chandan Panda.
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The ongoing Bab el-Mandeb (Gate of Tears) crisis, which has triggered a surge in crude oil prices, could strain the fragile energy supply chain and disrupt global shipping routes. The Houthis have seized the Greater Hanish, Lesser Hanish, and Mayun (Perim) Islands, as well as Mocha (Mokha) Port along the Red Sea Coast, thereby gaining control of Bab el-Mandeb. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a critical maritime chokepoint that links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and, to the south, the Indian Ocean. It is also Asia’s gateway to the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean Sea, and the Port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands to the North. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait ensures the vitality of global trade. It transits 10% to 15% of global maritime trade, with over $1 trillion worth of goods annually. It is also an alternative energy route to the Strait of Hormuz. Energy supply will be paralysed if the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is closed. The dual closure will lead to a complete disruption and unmanageable crisis. It also involves serious energy and economic implications.
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a critical maritime route for Saudi Arabian crude export. Saudi Arabia has suspended the East-West pipeline, which supplied approximately four to five million barrels of crude oil via Red Sea ports to global markets after the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia’s West coast is significant for maritime connectivity, trade, and development. Jeddah Islamic Port, located on the Eastern shore of the Red Sea, is the Kingdom’s major transhipment hub, alongside the UAE’s Jebel Ali Port on the Southern shore of the Persian Gulf. Jeddah port tranships goods to other major Indian Ocean ports/maritime nodes, such as the ports of Mundra, Nhava Sheva, Cochin (India), Colombo (Sri Lanka), Tanjung Pelepas (Malaysia), Singapore (Singapore), Sanghai, Qingdao, Ningbo-Zhousan (China), Busan (South Korea) and Djibouti (Djibouti), linking Southeast Asia, East Asia and East Africa in multi-lateral maritime architecture. Hence, Houthi attacks could obstruct the smooth flow of goods to major Asian economies through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and vice versa. Besides, Saudi Arabia's economic diversification programme under Vision 2030, such as the $500 billion NEOM project, the $20 billion Amallla, an ultra-luxurious tourism project, the King Abdullah Economic City Special Economic Zone (SEZ), and the Jazan SEZ on the Red Sea coast, could face heightened security risks.
The disruption at Bab el-Mandeb has precipitated a dual-chokepoint crisis. The combined effect of Bab el-Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz could be disruptive, particularly to the energy supply chain and markets. The cargo ships may have to travel around Africa's Cape of Good Hope, leading to a surge in costs, travel time, and insurance rates.
The Houthis are located in northern and western Yemen. They follow Zaydism, a branch of Shia Islam that accounts for around 35% of the Yemeni population. Zayid Imams ruled North Yemen from 897 CE until the Republican takeover in 1962. Yemen emerged as a unified country with the merger of North Yemen (Yemen Arab Republic) and South Yemen (People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen) in 1990. Ali Abdullah Saleh concurrently became the President of the newly formed Republic of Yemen. After the unification, the Houthis began a youth-led movement called Al-Shabab al-Mu'min (the Believing Youth) to revive Zaidi traditions in North Yemen. Later, it transformed into a Shia Islamist military and political organisation, known as Ansar Allah (Supporters of God), spearheaded by Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi. Subsequently, it launched a war against President Saleh, alleging massive corruption and marginalisation of Zaydis in the politico-economic landscape of Yemen. Saleh resorted to the repressive State apparatus to crush the movement and killed its founder, Hussein al-Houthi, in 2004. Hussein's brother, Abdul Malik al-Houthi, succeeded and took the mantle of leadership of Ansar Allah.
The Houthis took over Sanaa by waging an armed struggle and forming a strategic alliance with former President Saleh, a Zayid Shia from North Yemen, in 2014. They seized the Yemeni Presidential palace in January 2015, forcing President Abdrabbuh Abdullah Mansour Hadi, a Sunni leader from South Yemen, to flee to Riyadh. The Houthis formed a parallel government by creating a Supreme Political Council and ran a parallel economy by controlling the State enterprises. Thereafter, Saudi Arabia undertook a military intervention in Yemen to quell the Houthis’ strongholds and checkmate growing Iranian influence in the region. Riyadh acknowledged the Hadi government as the legitimate government in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2216, adopted on April 14, 2015. President Hadi transferred his powers to the Presidential Leadership Council, Yemen’s internationally recognised government, in April 2022. Saudi Arabia did not recognise the de facto government of Houthis in Sanaa. A recapitulation shows that the current crisis was attributed to sectarian rivalry, domestic political contestation, Saudi strategic posturing, and regional power rivalry.
The Houthi takeover of key ports and islands in the Red Sea is a strategic move to assert their dominance over waterways. They know the importance of Bab el-Mandeb, the world's most critical maritime chokepoint. The current cross-border escalation between Saudi Arabia and Houthi forces has exacerbated the conflict, having a direct bearing on trade and supply chain along Bab-el-Mandeb. The Houthis are a key constituent of Tehran's regional Axis of Resistance, serving as a primary proxy in the Red Sea. Tehran reportedly funds and supplies intelligence, and an arsenal that covers anti-ship cruise missiles, advanced drones, and sea mines. They are capable of choking Bab el-Mandeb and international shipping. They have successfully utilised the Yemeni grievances to justify their entry into Yemen.
The Houthi blockade of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait combines conflict with Saudi Arabia, alignment with Iran’s regional strategy and maximisation of leverage over global trade. The blockade will impact Saudi Arabia’s economic lifeline. The Houthis have choked the Saudi crude exports at the Bab-el-Mandeb. These developments apply maximum financial pressure on Saudi Arabia, presumably the severest in the last 30 years. The chokepoint strategy from both ends, such as the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, increases Tehran's global leverage. In retaliation for Saudi strikes, the Houthis have targeted the energy infrastructure, Yanbu Port and Khamis Mushait Airbase of the Kingdom with drones and missiles. Still, the signatories of the Mecca Pact remain quiet and declare no joint operation against the Houthis. The crisis at Bab el-Mandeb puts the Mecca pact to the test, which stipulates that ‘armed attack on any of the three countries one will be treated as an attack on all’, like the NATO collective defence pact. Neither Pakistan nor Turkey could come to the rescue of Saudi Arabia. States could reconfigure their geopolitical positioning amid shifting regional dynamics, prioritising national interests over mutual defence. The Houthis ' strike in the Red Sea region would intensify the conflict and redefine the geoeconomic calculus of the maritime trading States that rely on the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint.
(The views expressed are personal)
This article is authored by Jajati K Pattnaik, professor and chairperson, Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and Chandan Panda, professor, Central University of Karnataka, Karnataka.
